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REPLY
MANIPULATION BY CLIENT AND
CONTEXT: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR MORRIS

Stephen Ellmann*
In his thoughtful comment' on my article, 2 John K.
Morris raises two broad issues. I sought to explicate the
contours of lawyering practice in the support of clients' autonomy, and the latter part of Morris' piece proposes to
redraw some of these contours. 3 I also used lawyers' responsibility for supporting their clients' autonomy as the
touchstone for judging their treatment of their clients, and
in the first part of his article Morris argues for the importance of other interests as well. 4 Let me first consider again
the proper elements of practice meant to aid clients' autonomy, and then ask whether and to what extent such practice
should be modified because of interests other than the
clients'.
*

I am grateful to Robert Amdur and Nancy Rosenbloom for their comments during my work on this response.
1. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on
Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781 (1986).
2. Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1986). I had the benefit of reading Professor Morris' comment before making my last, minor revisions
to my own article, but none of these revisions, I think, altered the substance of our
differences of view. More importantly, I had already substantially rewritten the
paper which Professor Morris had available to him when he drafted his piece, and
largely as a result the debate between us may seem somewhat less pointed than it
might otherwise have been. Nonetheless I believe that our areas of agreement
and disagreement still to a large extent emerge.
3. Morris, supra note 1, at 800-09.
4. Id. at 785-800.
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THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT AUTONOMY

In my article I argue that the techniques of interviewing
and counseling recommended by David Binder and Susan
Price 5 in their guidelines for client-centered practice are in
many respects manipulative. 6 I also suggest that important
instances of the manipulative conduct they recommend, as
well as some they do not urge, can be justified. Specifically,
I accept the use of non-judgmental empathetic understanding as a way of helping emotionally troubled clients, and offer the same rationale for the carefully structured
decisionmaking process that Binder and Price endorse. 7 I
also assert the appropriateness of manipulation when an illinformed client cannot be effectively helped by either education or simplification to understand the issues he must decide.8 But I emphasize as well that manipulation is a
troublesome form of attorney behavior, which should not be
undertaken without justification and which may, if used at
one point in an attorney-client relationship, constrain the attorney's behavior at other, later stages. 9
Morris agrees "that lawyers influence clients in a variety
of ways, that it is worthwhile to examine the effects of such
influence, that client autonomy and client decisionmaking
are important, and that interference with client decisionmaking requires justification."1 0 But he resists calling clientcentered techniques "manipulation," and he defends some
of these techniques-including some that I also accept-on
rather problematic grounds.
A.

The Definition of Manipulation

Should the techniques I discussed be called "manipulation," or should they be classed under Morris' rubric of "influence"? I defined manipulation as "an effort by one person
to guide another's thoughts or actions in a direction desired
by the person guiding, by means that undercut the other
5. D.

BINDER

&

S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-

CENTERED APPROACH (1977).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Ellmann, supra note 2, at 733-53.
Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 767.
See, e.g., id. at 776-78.
Morris, supra note 1, at 783 (footnote omitted).
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person's ability to make a vigilant decision."" Such conduct
includes "lying, for example, or withholding of relevant information, or playing on emotional needs of which the other
person is unaware."' 12 Morris argues that "manipulation" is
unfairly pejorative.' l One response might be that lying and
comparable conduct plainly deserve a pejorative label.
But this answer would not be sufficient, and I do find
Morris' objection troubling. I take him to be arguing that
much of the behavior in which I find falsity, withholding of
information, or similar features is actually so benign, or familiar, or essential that its dissection in this manner is unfair.
To Morris, the manipulative elements of this conduct are,
perhaps, simply too insignificant, too "trivia[l],"' 14 to warrant
so harsh a label as "manipulation."
Client-centered techniques surely are sometimes employed in circumstances so substantially free of manipulative
design or effect that they do not constitute manipulation.
Whatever the proper label for discrete instances or elements
of such lawyering, however, the battery of techniques available to the client-centered lawyer offers, particularly in the
aggregate, the potential for substantial interference with clients' decisionmaking. Moreover, we certainly should not
avoid the term "manipulation" because of the good intentions of those who use these techniques; paternalistic manipulation is surely familiar conduct among parents,
governments, and, I suspect, lawyers. 15 If we do not face
squarely those elements of even well-intentioned lawyering
that represent the deflection of one person's emotions or
understanding by another, we can hardly hope to fashion
less intrusive methods of practice. And if we call such conduct by the colorless term "influence," we may also miss the
11. Ellmann, supra note 2, at 732.
12. Id. at 726.
13. Morris, supra note 1, at 800-01 n.78.
14. See id. at 805.

15. Nor do dictionary definitions assert, as Morris seems to, see Morris, supra
note 1, at 800-01 n.78, that only conduct directed to the actor's own advantage is
manipulation. See id. (quoting VI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 125-26 (1933)
(manipulation is "[t]he act of operating upon or managing persons or things with
dexterity; esp. with disparaging implication, unfair management or treatment"));
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1376 (1971) (definition 1(d) of
manipulation: "management with use of unfair, scheming, or underhanded methods esp. for one's own advantage"). Selfish manipulation may be the most familiar form-but selfless manipulation is hardly unheard of.
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moral truth that even such benign intervention can make
profound and troubling inroads on its subjects.
B.

The Use of Non-Judgmental Empathetic Regard

These differences of terminology are reflected in the
differences of substance that Morris identifies as well. Morris clearly feels that substantively, as well as definitionally, at
least one form of attorney conduct that I argued was manipulative, the use of non-judgmental empathetic regard, does
not deserve a great deal of concern.' 6 He suggests that empathy works only if it is sincere; 17 from this premise it might
be argued that any efforts by the lawyer to project empathy
while feeling other, or additional, emotions will be unsuccessful.18 This conclusion, however, does not necessarily
follow from its premise. If we can love the sinner and hate
the sin, it seems likely that a lawyer can sincerely feel empathy for a client while also feeling a variety of other emotions,
such as disapproval. When the lawyer sincerely expresses
her empathy, but conceals other, less supportive emotions in
order to avoid being judgmental, she may well be acting
manipulatively.
Suppose, however, that such an incomplete self-presentation will in fact register on the client as insincere and so
lose any manipulative force it might otherwise have had. If
so, this would certainly moot any ethical worry about the fal16. Morris, supra note 1, at 803-05.
17. Id. at 803-04 & n.94. If clients will see through false or incompletely
presented feelings, then in lawyer-client encounters where the lawyer's feelings
take on importance for the client, only lawyers with positive feelings, or perhaps
even wholly positive feelings, could meet the clients' requirements. It might then
be argued that in such circumstances "counselors and clients have to like each
other for effective legal consultation to take place." Robert S. Redmount and
Thomas L. Shaffer raise this possibility, and appear partially to accept it for nonlitigation contexts, in R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 19-23 (1980).
18. I do not think that Binder and Price would agree that a lawyer can use
empathy only if that is her sole emotion towards the client. Binder and Price take
up this issue in their discussion of "difficulties in mastering active listening." D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 5, at 33-34. They suggest that an interviewer who

feels unable to empathize with a client may only be unable to empathize with particular feelings, id. at 34, and so, presumably, could express empathy with other
aspects of the client's situation. They also describe at length, though they do not
expressly endorse, "a belief that lawyers can adequately employ active listening
techniques even though they cannot truly empathize ....

For lawyers with these

beliefs, such action is the only appropriate response of a professional whose job is
to represent people in need." Id.
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sity or incompleteness of non-judgmental empathetic regard. If we extend the argument to suggest that clients will
perceive insincerity whenever it appears in the lawyer's use
of any of the facilitators described by Binder and Price, then
we could dismiss concern about falsity in interviewing altogether. We would also then have to ask whether lawyers can
effectively interview clients, or witnesses, in circumstances
where they cannot sincerely deploy some or all of these
facilitators-or, at least, whether some other arsenal of
weapons besides those offered by Binder and Price is available for such cases.
But we know that lies and half-truths sometimes work.
Perhaps, as Morris suggests, a client-centered psychotherapist cannot function effectively unless she is able to be genuine and "real" in her sessions. 19 It may well be true that a
lawyer who feels absolutely no positive feeling towards a client cannot adequately represent him. 20 Yet, as Morris himself points out, 2 '

legal counseling is not identical to

psychotherapy. Legal counseling is likely to be fairly brief,22
19. Morris, supra note 1, at 803-04 & n.94 (quoting Rice, The Relationship in
Client-Centered Therapy, in PSYCHOLOGY AND PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS 36, 42 (M.
Lambert ed. 1983)). I must admit to doubt that even client-centered therapists
always feel for their patients only the empathic understanding and unconditional
positive regard that Rice describes as being additional conditions of effective client-centered work. A more psychoanalytic theory, by contrast, seems to expect
the therapist to develop a range of emotional reactions to her patient, known as
the "counter-transference," and stimulated both by the actual interaction between
patient and therapist and by the therapist's own past experiences and psychological traits. See WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS 11-26 (1976), quoted in G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:

230-32 (1978).
20. In such cases as these, "a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
21. Morris, supra note 1, at 803-04 n.93.
22. In courts of general jurisdiction, "a typical [litigated] case involves relatively few lawyer hours .... " Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY

Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 90 (1983).

Donald Gifford has

used data from this study to estimate the time spent in negotiations, see D. Gifford,
The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving ClientCentered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context (paper presented at the UCLAWarwick International Clinical Conference), and we may similarly estimate the
time spent in client sessions. Trubek and his colleagues report data indicating
that the median case studied took 30.4 hours of a lawyer's time, and that the mean
for these cases was 72.9 hours. Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman,
supra, at 90. They also report that lawyers spent 16% of their time in these cases
conferring with their clients. Id. at 91. (Perhaps some additional time described
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so that the client does not have the time to perceive the nuances of behavior that a therapeutic patient might pick up.
The client may also be less likely to scrutinize his lawyer with
the intensity that a patient may bring to bear on his therapist, for he probably expects from the lawyer legal assistance
rather than a probing of his most intimate thoughts and feelings. While clients may sense the lawyer's concealed feelings even in briefer interactions, and may maintain some
measure of reserve towards the lawyer as a result, we cannot
assume that they will be fully aware of, or immune to,
the lawyer's insincere efforts at empathy or other
23
encouragement.
C.

The Structuring of Client Decisionmaking

Morris does acknowledge that another aspect of clientcentered lawyering, the lawyer's withholding of her opinion,
presumably does influence clients, even if it does not manipulate them. But he argues both that the lawyer should decide how to structure the decisionmaking process and that
this particular structure, in which the lawyer withholds her
opinion, is appropriate. 24 While I do not wholly disagree
with either of these conclusions, I address these questions by
routes somewhat different than those Morris follows.
The lawyer should choose the structure of the decisionmaking process, Morris writes, because the lawyer is more
competent to do so, and because her doing so is consistent
with client expectations.2 5 To say that the lawyer is more
competent suggests that the choice of a decisionmaking
method is a matter of technique and expertise rather than a
question of values. A client who prefers to make decisions
impulsively, however, may be expressing a conviction about
how he wishes to lead his life rather than a misunderstandas factual investigation also involved the clients, but this possibility need not concern us here.) A rough figure for the median time spent in client conferences,
then, would be 16% of 30.4 hours, or slightly less than 5 hours. It seems plausible
that comparable nonlitigated cases involving individual clients call for attorneyclient sessions of somewhat similar length.
23. For additional discussion of the reasons for concern that unsophisticated
clients may accept, or even exaggerate, the warm feelings they perceive from their
lawyers, see Ellmann, supra note 2, at 734-39.
24. See Morris, supra note 1, at 805-07.
25. Id. at 427.

ing of the most efficient mode of decisionmaking.26
Moreover, even if we view the choice of a decisionmaking method as solely a matter of technique, it is far from
clear that lawyers' skills in decisionmaking are so sharply superior to those of their clients that lawyers should make the
decisions about process unilaterally, without consultation
and without even acknowledging that decisions are being
made. Morris is no doubt correct that "[l]awyers are more
likely than clients to have thought purposefully about how to
structure the attorney-client interaction," 27 but we may well
question how thoroughly lawyers have pondered this matter
and how much expertise their thinking has won them.
We may also question the value of expertise in this area.
After all, decisionmaking is not an altogether arcane science;
everyone makes decisions all the time. Many people may
have a quite good idea of how they best make decisions, and
some of those ideas may be inconsistent with any preconceived structures favored by their lawyers. Such clients may,
for example, be quite capable of telling their lawyer whether
28
they want to hear her advice or not.

Morris might suggest that such people as these should
indeed be treated differently by lawyers, but that other clients, the ones he believes I am concerned with, are not so
capable. Morris sees the clients on whom I focus as perhaps
being at one "extreme[] of the client continuum" 29 -competent but unsophisticated, powerless, and distraught.
Though such people are indeed part of my concern, I believe that the range of clients potentially subject to manipulation or coercion is considerably broader than this. I wrote
26. See Ellmann, supra note 2, at 729.
27. Morris, supra note 1, at 807.
28. The argument that clients have the ability to select, or at least participate
in selecting, a decisionmaking process resembles arguments that clients have the
ability to make decisions on the merits of their cases as well. For an illustrative
example of the latter argument, see D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? (1977). There Douglas E. Rosenthal addresses at length the question of
whether the problems of personal injury litigation are "clear choices which professionals are trained to make with a high degree of certainty according to relatively standardized and objective criteria-choices and criteria which,
furthermore, tend to be inaccessible to lay comprehension." Id. at 63. He concludes that "so many of the factors that will influence the claim outcome are unforseeable even to the specialist, that a lay client who knows his own feelings is
qualified to participate in the assessment of what is to be gained or lost by alternative choices." Id. at 93.
29. Morris, supra note 1, at 799.

1010

UCLA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1003

that my article was "particularly concerned with individual
clients, relatively unskilled in legal matters, and relatively
disadvantaged in their dealings with lawyers," 30 and I added
my suspicion "that even rich and well-informed clients
sometimes find themselves at least subtly steered by their attorneys."3' If the class of clients at risk of manipulation is in
fact this wide, then it hardly seems plausible to suggest that
every member of this group is unqualified to assist in selecting a decisionmaking style.
But even if we focus solely on the most disadvantaged
end of the client continuum, as Morris suggests, I do not
think we should so quickly assume that clients are unable to
participate in structuring their relationship with their attorney. Many people may suffer such inability when they enter
the lawyer's office; some surely will not. Among those who
do, the lawyer will find some who can acquire this competence if the lawyer works with them to help them do so. If
the lawyer simply assumes her clients are incapable, rather
than inquiring carefully of each individual and helping those
who can gain this capacity to do so, I think she runs the risk
of impinging on an important principle-that "our peers in
the world we live in, can and should make the decisions that
govern their own lives."

32

Nonetheless it could be argued that the lawyer's choice
of decisionmaking method is justified by clients' expectations, if not by their capacities. Morris invokes client expectations in defending both lawyers' choosing a method and
their deciding, in dealing with substantially disadvantaged
clients, that the correct method is to withhold their own
views.33 But the argument from expectations has two
profound weaknesses. First, we have very little detailed
knowledge of what clients actually expect. If we must rely
on speculation, I would suggest that clients probably assume
that their lawyers will structure the process and will give advice about what they believe should be done; the latter expectation, of course, Binder and Price normally prefer not to
30. Ellmann, supra note 2, at 719 n.4.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 773. I realize that a lawyer might find such an effort to evaluate and
aid her clients prohibitively time-consuming. If so, she might well be justified in
manipulatively structuring the decisionmaking process. My point is not that manipulation must always be proscribed, but that it should always be acknowledged.
33. Morris, supra note 1, at 807.
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fulfill. Second, and perhaps more important, clients' expectations may grow out of the very disadvantage and confusion
that a lawyer seeks to ameliorate. For example, clients may
assume that lawyers will exercise control over them because
they do not realize that both lawyers and clients could act
differently. If clients would not accept the customary allocation of authority after they understood the possible roles
they could play, then their uninformed expectations may not
legitimize lawyers' continued exercise of that authority.
Having taken such issue with the details of Morris' argument on this score, however, I want to emphasize the extent
of my agreement with him. I did not focus on the question
in my article, but I agree that lawyers must sometimes structure the decisionmaking process unilaterally, particularly in
order to help an otherwise overwhelmed client. Similarly, I
acknowledged in my article that there may be cases in which
clients require so much support from their lawyer, and are
so prone to being overwhelmed by her, that the lawyer
should withhold her views on the correct choice among the
options the client faces. Finally, I share Morris' conviction
that the lawyer must vary the techniques she uses in light of
the varying capacities of the clients whom she serves-a belief also evident in Binder and Price. 34 I join in his hope that
further scholarship may provide us with guidelines that will
assist lawyers in dealing more sensitively with the different
clients whom they serve.
II.

THE INTERESTS OF LAWYERS AND OF THIRD PARTIES

While Morris considers my treatment of the lawyer's impact on her client's decisionmaking too exacting, he argues

that in focusing only on the protection of clients' autonomy I
have unduly narrowed the range of considerations that bear
34. Binder and Price approve, for example, of the lawyer's provision of her
own opinion to a client who is an "independent decision maker." D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, supra note 5, at 198. They also recognize that even a dependent client may

be so intent on hearing the lawyer's opinion of what he should do that the lawyer
may conclude that she should provide it. Id. at 200. In those cases in which "the
client's decision would very likely result in substantial economic, social, or psycho-

logical harm in return for very little gain," they recommend that the lawyer intervene in the client's decisionmaking. Id. at 203. It is most plainly in their
guidelines for the standard client, "someone who is willing [to make] and capable
of making a reasonable decision," id. at 192, that Binder and Price describe a
more limited role for attorneys-one which I have urged should be modified.
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on evaluating lawyers' conduct. He maintains that lawyers'
conduct should also be shaped in appropriate circumstances
by their own interests, and by the interests of third parties or
society. I agree that such considerations have a role in lawyers' conduct, but I do not think that they provide very firm
justification for manipulation of clients. Though I am not
certain whether or to what extent Morris would defend manipulation for the sake of lawyers or third parties, his argument for weighing autonomy interests against these other
concerns seems logically to permit the conclusion that manipulation for these reasons is appropriate. It is this possibility on which I want to concentrate here.
I wrote that "a lawyer's function is centrally to aid her
own clients in expressing and implementing their wishes." 35
Morris agrees that "client autonomy and client decisionmaking are important,"36 but perhaps does not concede that client autonomy is "central." 3 7 Whether client autonomy is the
central concern of the attorney, or merely a central concern,
need not detain us. If we merely take as a premise that client
autonomy is important, we can address the question of
whether manipulative breaches of this autonomy are
justifiable.
A.

The Interests of Attorneys

Morris suggests two broad attorney interests that deserve weight: their interest in "the competent and satisfying
performance of their craft," 38 and their interest in the moral
quality of their own actions. 39 Morris is quite right in saying
that I gave little attention to the first of these, the attorney's
interest in her craft. As important as job satisfaction is to an
attorney or any other worker, however, I am not convinced
that it provides a persuasive reason for attorneys to manipulate their clients.
For the interest in craft to justify a modification of attorney behavior that was otherwise mandated by client concerns, we would presumably have to conclude that without
this modification attorneys' satisfaction and effectiveness in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Ellmann, supra note 2, at 774.
Morris, supra note 1, at 783.
See, e.g., id. at 792.
Id. at 791.
Id.at 786-87.
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their work would be substantially diminished. I agree that a
claim that the forms of practice I endorse were ineffective
would raise a serious challenge to their use, though I would
probably consider it serious more because of its impact on
clients than because of its effect on attorneys. If practice in
the support of clients' autonomy is effective, however, then
the craft argument for its modification can rest only on the
need to increase attorneys' satisfaction. For such an argument to succeed, we would at the very least want clear reason to believe that attorneys were seriously dissatisfied and
that the change in question would significantly improve their
feelings about their work. Even then, we might well question whether attorneys should be allowed the pleasure of
serving their clients less effectively.
We need not resolve that question unless we can discern elements of practice in support of clients' autonomy
that do impair lawyers' competence or satisfaction. The
most vivid example of so flawed a form of practice that Morris suggests seems to be in his proposed remarks by a lawyer
laboriously seeking to dispel any falsity from her friendliness
to her client. 40 Since I don't advocate such behavior, I am
not troubled by the dissatisfaction or ineffectuality attorneys
might experience if they engaged in it. More generally, it
seems fair to observe that attorneys' work contains many obstacles and sources of frustration, which attorneys must
strive to overcome daily. To some extent lawyers' pleasure
in their craft is precisely a pride in overcoming such obstacles. If one of these obstacles were-as indeed it probably
is-the challenge of dealing properly with clients, I would
assume that attorneys would find satisfaction in meeting this
challenge as they do in meeting others.
The lawyer's interest in the moral quality of her actions
is a much more serious concern. I entirely agree that lawyers have an interest in acting in accordance with their values. 4 ' I believe Morris is right to express concern over the
potential effect of lawyering on lawyers' characters and to
recognize the lawyer's interest in doing morally justifiable
40. Id. at 805.
41. I discuss aspects of this interest in Ellmann, supra note 2, at 763-64,
774-76 & nn.165-67. (My brief reference to autonomy in note 166 was added
after I had read Morris' comment.)
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work. 42 But if this interest is to be the basis for abridging
clients' freedom from manipulation, we must again, at a minimum, have evidence that lawyers' moral freedom under existing rules is unduly constricted. Only then would it be
necessary to ask whether that freedom should be expanded
at the expense of clients.
Perhaps surprisingly, I believe that attorneys already enjoy substantial moral autonomy in their work-more autonomy, perhaps, than they are eager to exercise. The exact
borders of this autonomy are not entirely clear, but they are
suggested by a series of provisions in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers who are offered cases which they
find so repugnant that they could not handle them effectively are urged, or perhaps even required, to decline
them. 43 Even when lawyers could work effectively despite
their distaste for the case, they appear to have some freedom
44
to decline it.
Given their discretion to decline cases alto-

gether, lawyers may be able to offer instead to represent clients only for specific purposes, rather than to aid the clients
in those objectives of which they disapprove. 45 Once they
42. See Morris, supra note 1, at 787-91.
43. According to the MODEL CODE, supra note 20, EC 2-30, a lawyer "should
decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from
a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client."
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct direct the lawyer not to take a case
if "the lawyer's ... mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(2)
(1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
44. The Model Code declares that "[a] lawyer is under no obligation to act as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client," MODEL
CODE, supra note 20, EC 2-26. Because the Model Code also asserts that
"[r]egardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation
because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse," id. EC
2-27, however, it is difficult to determine the exact scope of a lawyer's prerogative
under these rules to reject a case because of moral or other scruples.
The Model Rules' view of this question can be inferred from the provision for
lawyers to withdraw from cases if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that
the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." MODEL RULES, supra note 43, Rule
1.16(b)(3). If the lawyer can rely on this justification for withdrawing from representation that has already begun, she surely can decline to enter a case at all for
the same reason.
45. The Model Rules expressly permit a lawyer to "limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES, supra note
43, Rule 1.2(c). The Comment to this Rule adds that "[s]uch limitations may exclude objectives or means that the lawyer regards as repugnant," although the
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have taken the case, moreover, attorneys remain free-or
even encouraged-to press moral concerns on their clients. 46 Should they fail in those efforts (and perhaps even if
they never undertake them), they are often entitled to with47
draw from a case for moral or other reasons.
In short, lawyers have considerable freedom not to represent clients or objectives of which they disapprove, and,
even after they have taken on a case, to challenge their clients or withdraw from the representation if they are faced
with morally repugnant demands upon them. To be sure,
lawyers' autonomy is not unlimited. For example, lawyers
cannot withdraw from litigation if the tribunal forbids their
withdrawal; 48 nor are they permitted by current rules to replawyer cannot secure the client's consent to incompetent representation or to surrender his right to terminate or settle the litigation. Id. Comment.
While the Model Code contains no provision directly paralleling Rule 1.2(c),
it does authorize a lawyer who feels that an action in the client's best interest is
unjust to "ask his client for permission to forego such action." MODEL CODE,
supra note 20, EC 7-9.
46. The Model Code urges the lawyer to "bring to bear upon this decisionmaking process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In
assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible." MODEL CODE, supra note 20, EC 7-8. In the MODEL RULES,
supra note 43, Rule 2.1, the lawyer is instructed that "[in representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client's situation."
47. Under the Model Code, a lawyer is required to withdraw if "[h]is mental
...condition renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively." MODEL CODE, supra note 20, DR 2-110(B)(3). The lawyer is
permitted to withdraw if his mental condition simply renders effective work "difficult." Id. DR 2-1 l0(C)(4). Withdrawal is also permitted if the client "[i]nsists, in
a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is
contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules." Id. DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(e). The lawyer is also at least generally
free to seek the client's "knowing and free assent" to withdrawal. See id. DR 2110(C)(5).
The Model Rules mandate withdrawal where the lawyer's mental condition
"materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client." MODEL RULES,
supra note 43, Rule 1.16(a)(2). The Rules also permit withdrawal, even if it will
damage the client's interests, where "a client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3).
The two sets of rules also contain fairly similar provisions requiring lawyers
to stay on cases where a court has refused to permit them to withdraw, even if
good grounds for withdrawal exist. See MODEL CODE, supra note 20, DR 2110(A)(1); MODEL RULES, supra note 43, Rule 1.16(c).
48. See supra note 47.
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resent someone whom they cannot serve loyally because of
their own personal beliefs or moral convictions. 49 Yet the
range of moral discretion open to lawyers overall seems
quite substantial.
Of course, the fact that lawyers have moral freedom
does not mean that they exercise it. Perhaps various aspects
of the lawyer's position, from the habit of adversariness to
the need for clients, effectively discourage lawyers from acting according to their own moral convictions.5 0 In that case,
one might argue that lawyers should be required to act more
morally. Lawyers themselves, however, do not appear to desire such constraint-as witness the bar's resistance to a
number of potential limits on adversariness contained in the
proposals for the Model Rules. 51 Hence further moral constraint on lawyers, if imposed for the sake of their own autonomy, might well constitute unjustifiable paternalism.
Given the extent of lawyers' moral freedom under present rules, and their reluctance to take on greater moral obligations, I think it is difficult to maintain that clients should
be subjected to greater manipulation in order to secure their
lawyers' moral autonomy. Even if we were to conclude that
lawyers' autonomy needed protection, I would think that impairing clients' autonomy through manipulation would not
be a preferred solution. Perhaps no other solution exists 52-but

I would want stronger proof of the need for such

conduct and of its value for attorney autonomy before
adopting a solution that so compounds the moral difficulties
of the attorney-client relationship.
49. Thus the Model Code declares that "[tihe professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal
interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." MODEL CODE, supra note 20, EC 5-1.
(The corresponding Disciplinary Rule, however, appears to permit such representation "with the consent of [the] client after full disclosure." Id. DR 5-101(A).)
The Model Rules offer similar guidelines. See MODEL RULES, supra note 43,
Rule 1.7(b) and Comment.
50. Deborah Rhode surveys some of these constraints in Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 626-38 (1985).
51. For discussion of the bar's dilution of such proposals during consideration of the Model Rules, see id. at 592-626.
52. Murray L. Schwartz expresses considerable, though not complete, pessimism about the prospects for bringing lawyers to take personal moral responsibility for their work in Schwartz, Comment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 653 (1985).
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The Interests of Third Parties and Society

Morris also argues that the attorney's treatment of her
clients should be shaped by the interests of third parties or
of society. I entirely agree with Morris that the moral quality
of attorneys' conduct should be judged, in part, by its effects
on others besides the client. Moreover, Morris and I appear
to be in substantial agreement that in certain circumstances
attorneys should give moral, if not political, advice to their
clients, 53 although he appears to rest this judgment primarily on the interests of lawyers and third parties, 54 while I assert the client's interest in fully competent decisionmaking
as a primary rationale. 55 But Morris argues that the standard for determining when such advice should be given can
probably only be "careful consideration of the various interests that are involved." 56 This guidance suggests that he
might permit such advice even when its impact proved manipulative, because of the interests of the lawyer and of third
parties that it might serve. I have already set out my reasons
for resisting manipulation in the interest of the lawyer; I believe that manipulation and comparable exercises of attorney power over clients in the interests of third parties are
also likely to be troublesome.
Such conduct is problematic, first, because the need for
it is not clear. I share Morris' concern that much of what
lawyers do may not promote just results. 57 But manipula53. Morris suggests, in Morris, supra note 1, at 808 n.103, that Binder and
Price also accept the propriety of moral or political discussion between lawyer and
client. I do not think the footnote he cites, D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 5, at
148 n.7, wholly bears him out, for this footnote is largely limited to a survey of the
bar's ethical pronouncements rather than an explication of recommendations of
Binder and Price themselves. Moreover, since Binder and Price are generally opposed to the lawyer's giving her opinion, afortiori they must generally oppose her
explicating her own moral and political views about the client's situation---opinions that may not even fully speak in terms of the client's own values. See also
Ellmann, supra note 2, at 748-50. David Binder has indicated to me, however, that
he does believe that there are some circumstances in which the lawyer can appropriately express her own moral views.
54. See Morris, supra note 1, at 808-09.
55. See Ellmann, supra note 2, at 774-76. I share Morris' belief, however, that
such conduct also vindicates the lawyer's own interest in moral autonomy. See id.
at 859 n.167.
56. Morris, supra note 1,at 809.
57. See id. at 790. For extended discussion of such problems, see Rhode, supra
note 50, at 595-626; Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83-122 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
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tion for the sake of third parties, like manipulation in the
lawyer's interest, is an intrusion on clients' rights. It bears
remembering, moreover, that manipulation for these purposes, unlike manipulation on behalf of the client, cannot be
called benign-at least from the client's point of view-and
so should be harder to justify than the manipulative conduct
characteristic of client-centered lawyering. Surely such intrusion should not take place unless less troublesome
courses of action are unavailable and unless manipulation is
likely to be an effective tool in protecting third parties'
rights. I am inclined to think that manipulation could be effective, at least in many cases, but I am not persuaded that
lawyers who made full use of their existing ethical discretion
would have a pressing need for this further weapon.5 8
Second, public recognition that lawyers may manipulate
clients in the interests of third parties seems bound to create
problems in attorney-client relationships, even in cases in
which the attorney contemplates no manipulative conduct.
These problems would resemble those likely to be triggered
by the nonprofessional advocacy urged by Simon. 59 Perhaps
these difficulties could be ameliorated if lawyers systematically concealed from their clients their belief that they were
entitled in some circumstances to manipulate them. But
surely such massive concealment, even if it were practicable,
would pose ethical problems of its own.
Third, the endorsement of such conduct is troublesome
because it is so hard to define appropriate standards for it.
This difficulty is evident in Morris' own account. Morris recognizes that "[l]ack of consensus on vague social goals may
cause one to hesitate to impair client autonomy in their
name. "60 But he asserts that "immediate harm to identifiable persons is easier to ascertain and more concrete in a
way that makes it an appropriate counterweight to client
autonomy." 61
I believe this standard is more elusive than Morris acknowledges. After all, "immediate harm to identifiable per58. Perhaps lawyers cannot be persuaded to use their existing moral autonomy. Yet the moral weakness of lawyers is at least a troubling justification for
increasing their power over their clients.
59. See Ellmann, supra note 2, at 757-58 & n.114.
60. Morris, supra note 1, at 793; see Ellmann, supra note 2, at 774.
61. Morris, supra note 1, at 793.
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sons" can be described as the goal of much legal action,
including criminal prosecutions and many if not most civil
suits. Just punishment is not wrong, nor is the just imposition of damages or injunctions, despite the harm they work.
The criterion for intervention therefore cannot be "harm"
but rather something akin to "unjust harm." But when "injustice" becomes the standard, surely we must approach and
frequently enter the realm of "vague social goals" on which
62
there is no consensus.
So ambiguous a standard puts broad discretion in the
hands of attorneys. Some lawyers may intervene rarely. We
might speculate that these attorneys will be precisely those
attorneys who already feel most subject to their clients'
power-yet these attorneys, and their powerful and sophisticated clients, are presumably the people whose actions
wreak the greatest harm on ill-defended adversaries and undefended third parties. Other attorneys may intervene much
more frequently. Again, we might speculate that relatively
unsophisticated clients, whose ability to "shop around" for a
lawyer may be quite limited, 63 will have little success in identifying those lawyers with whom they feel morally compatible, and so-unlike their more deft and destructive
counterparts-will be subject to the vagaries of individual attorneys' moral predilections.
Finally, such conduct is troublesome to the extent that it
abridges clients' legal rights. 64 I have argued that the cli62. Thus Murray Schwartz, though he advocates lawyers' moral responsibility
for the clients' ends in civil contexts, observes that the question of such accountability "probably touches upon relatively few instances of lawyer behavior. In the
overwhelming majority of civil cases, there will be no significant moral issue; the
client's ends will be clearly moral ones, or if the moral conclusion is unclear, there
will be reasonable arguments on both sides." Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 150, 161 (D.
Luban ed. 1983). Similarly, Deborah Rhode argues that lawyers can take moral
responsibility despite the presence of uncertainty, Rhode, supra note 50, at
622-23, but comments that "[for lawyers in practice, the appeal of [moral] agnosticism often increases [beyond what law school encourages]. Pure victims and villains are hard to come by; factual uncertainties, extenuating circumstances, and
normative dissonance confound all but the rarest cases." Id. at 618.
63. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 28, at 129 (commenting that according to his
study of New York personal injury claimants, a study which preceded the rise of
lawyers' advertising, "[g]enerally speaking, clients choose the first lawyer they
know who comes to mind, the first lawyer recommended to them, or the first lawyer they meet").
64. In my article I wrote that "such intervention [on behalf of third parties]
seems very hard to square with the premise that a lawyer's function is centrally to
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ent's right to pursue his legal claims is an aspect of his au-

tonomy, the impairment of which should trouble us. 6 5

While the applicability of concerns for autonomy to institutional clients can be debated, 66 those relatively unsophisticated, individual clients most likely to face manipulation are
also probably those whose autonomy is most meaningfully
affected by the course of their legal claims. Even where autonomy is not at stake, moreover, the abridgement of legal
rights-which are, after all, the product of our efforts at collective self-government-on the basis of individual lawyers'
moral codes seems to me to trench on the broad interests of
third parties, and society at large, in democratic decisionmaking. I question, therefore, whether a system that approves such intervention will in fact protect citizens'
interests better than the one we now have. 67
aid her own clients in expressing and implementing their wishes." Ellmann, supra
note 2, at 774. This statement was somewhat too broad, at least in one respect,
for the lawyer's function is not to aid her clients in achieving her wishes at any cost
but to assist them in realizing their objectives within the law. Particularly if the
lawyer's interventions merely avert clients' violations of the law, as in the prevention of perjury, the lawyer does not disserve her function of lawfully assisting the
client. Moreover, attorneys' efforts to enforce the law are not subject to such
forceful charges of vagueness and unpredictability as their efforts to pursue their
personal moral or political convictions would be-although these charges may
still retain some force.
While attorneys' enforcement of legal standards is thus less subject to some
of the objections that I have raised against their protection of third parties in
general, manipulation even-perhaps sometimes especially-in the service of law
enforcement does seem to me to pose a risk of undermining trust between lawyer
and client. Ironically, a requirement that attorneys monitor their clients' compliance with some set of legal requirements might also conflict with lawyers' beliefs
that their clients are morally right even if they are legally wrong, and so might
limit attorneys' moral autonomy. Before we increase such costs as these by expanding attorneys' law enforcement role, we should first assess whether such a
role for attorneys is needed and likely to be effective. Cf. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1984).

I have benefited from discussion of attorneys' law enforcement role with
Bruce Ackerman.
65. Ellmann, supra note 2, at 759-60.
66. Compare A.

GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

128 (1980) (questioning the application of autonomy to corporations) with Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1075-76 (1976) (asserting the appropriateness of protecting the autonomy
of institutional clients).
67. Alan Goldman challenges this concern on a number of grounds. See A.
GOLDMAN, supra note 66, at 128-33, 140-48. His own proposed standard of intervention, however, seems to me to illustrate the risks entailed in calling for such
conduct. For Goldman urges that lawyers:
aid [their] clients in achieving all and only that to which they have
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Nonetheless, I have argued that lawyers should give
moral or political advice to some of their clients. Morris
contends that my approval of lawyers' giving such advice is
inconsistent with opposition to lawyers' intervening in their
clients' decisions for the sake of third parties or society. 68 If

the rationale for lawyers' giving such advice were primarily
that their advice protected the interests of third parties, this
objection would be a telling one.
I suggest, however, that such advice aids the clients
themselves, by helping them to make more fully autonomous decisions.69 Despite their flaws as champions of third
parties, lawyers may be able to engage their clients in moral
or political dialogue that will have this effect. Lawyers'
weaknesses, after all, are hardly unique. Few people have
views untainted by prejudice or preconception or self-interest-yet people can learn from encountering each other's
different views. Moreover, to the extent that moral or political judgment is informed by experience, lawyers' judgments
will sometimes benefit from the broader acquaintance they
may have with particular problems (such as, for example, the
impact of various divorce custody arrangements on children). Finally, while lawyers' acquisition of moral or political wisdom may be spotty or unpredictable, their attainment
of interviewing and counseling skills is more a matter of
training and practice. Though they are rarely saints or political visionaries, lawyers can learn to be skilled counselors.
For these reasons, lawyers may succeed in aiding their
clients' autonomy by offering them moral or political advice,
even though they generally should not seek to protect the
interests of third parties by manipulating their clients. The
moral rights. This would call upon lawyers to exercise independent
judgment in refusing to violate moral rights of others even in the
pursuit of that to which clients might be legally entitled. It also
might call upon them to exceed legal bounds in order to realize
moral rights of their clients.
Id. at 138. Perhaps Goldman is right that, except where the supply of lawyers is
limited, only clients with blatantly immoral legal claims will be unable to obtain
representation under this standard, id. at 130-31, although this view seems to pay
little heed to search costs. But the range of cases in which lawyers might find
moral justification for violating the law on their clients' behalf, if such conduct
were considered morally praiseworthy, does not seem to confirm Goldman's assurance that such violations of the law will be "rare," id. at 146.
68. Morris, supra note 1, at 792 n.49.
69. See supra note 55.
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successes of such moral or political counselors, to be sure,
will not be automatic or universal, for the weaknesses that
afflict lawyers' judgment and understanding certainly will
limit their ability to give fruitful advice. Still, I would hope
that on balance such counseling would improve clients' own
assessment of moral and political issues, and that the failures
of this counseling will themselves promote the search for
better methods of carrying out this process.
If such counseling achieves its modest goal, it may also
achieve another. When clients address more fully the moral
and political impact of their own decisions, they may honor
the interests of third parties and of society more wholeheartedly or more wisely, and so, in the end, a lawyer's advice
may protect not only the client's autonomy but the needs of
those whom the client affects as well. In this indirect way,
then, the lawyer's giving of moral or political advice may
also be justified as a protection of third parties in societydespite strong arguments against lawyers' manipulation for
the same purpose.
All that said, I must still acknowledge that the interests
of third parties could be so morally pressing that they would
justify the moral harm involved in lawyers' manipulation of
their clients. But I do not think that the case for general
acceptance of the legitimacy of manipulation for the sake of
third parties has yet been made.
CONCLUSION

Though Professor Morris and I disagree on a range of
issues, I suspect that we are in agreement on the answers to
many or most of the questions about the proper treatment
of clients and others, in"particular cases. We are certainly in
agreement on the need to continue to refine both our techniques for working with clients and our understanding of the
reasons for selecting, or not selecting, particular modes of
70
conduct for particular clients and contexts.

70. These efforts, to which Binder and Price have already contributed so
much, will surely be further advanced by their forthcoming volume (with Paul
Bergman) in this field.

